The United States Air Force has begun B-52 bombing missions over Iran, a senior US military official said in a Department of War briefing on 31 March, marking a visible escalation in the air campaign against Tehran. General Dan Caine, identified by the Pentagon as the Chairmain of the Joint Chiefs, told reporters the long‑range Stratofortress bombers are being used to expand the reach and tempo of strikes after earlier missile attacks focused largely on static targets.
Caine framed the move as possible because Iranian air‑defence capabilities have been sharply degraded during the opening weeks of the conflict. Citing what he described as growing aerial supremacy for US and Israeli forces, he said the B‑52s allow US commanders “to get on top of the enemy” and “switch towards more and more dynamic targets servicing mobile targets around the battle space.” He contrasted the aircraft’s employment with the earlier reliance on costly precision missile strikes against immobile military infrastructure.
Israeli military statements have bolstered the US assessment. The Israel Defence Forces said on 30 March that the joint campaign had eliminated some 80% of Iran’s air‑defence systems, a figure that, if accurate, underpins why the US feels able to send non‑stealthy, high‑altitude bombers into Iranian airspace. Even so, US officials acknowledge the campaign’s limits: the Iranian regime has shifted to asymmetric tactics, particularly measures aimed at disrupting international trade through the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic chokepoint for global oil and shipping.
Those naval and maritime threats remain a priority for US planners. Caine said the broader campaign continues to target production facilities and depots where Iran builds and stores anti‑ship missiles and sea mines, aiming to blunt Tehran’s capacity to weaponize the Gulf. Analysts point to parallels with earlier campaigns in which Iran‑aligned forces used asymmetric operations to extend conflicts despite technological disadvantages, such as Houthi attacks that disrupted traffic in the Red Sea.
Questions remain about whether Iran could still intercept the B‑52s. Iran fields long‑range indigenous systems such as the Bavar‑373, which has a maximum detection range cited at roughly 320 kilometres, far greater than the 50,000‑foot (about 15.2 km) operational ceiling of a B‑52H. Russia‑supplied S‑300PMU‑2 batteries also theoretically pose a threat to non‑stealthy aircraft. But defence analysts say the effectiveness of remaining Iranian systems may be limited by damage sustained early in the fight and by the replacement of original sensors; one GlobalData analyst observed that modified S‑300 sites are likely operating with Iranian radars that offer inferior detection compared with the original equipment.
The deployment of B‑52s underscores a shift from a primarily missile‑based campaign toward sustained, aircraft‑delivered bombing intended to press mobile Iranian targets. Still, despite apparent air superiority, the US does not control the tempo of the conflict: officials concede the campaign has not decisively ended Tehran’s asymmetric leverage. Five weeks into hostilities, the war has evolved into a contest between technological superiority in the air and Iran’s ability to use the Gulf’s geography and proxy tactics to prolong and complicate the fight.